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Infamous Misdemeanors and the Grand 
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  INTRODUCTION   
Under an overlooked body of constitutional law, many more 
federal offenses should be prosecuted by grand jury indictment 
than is now the practice. Under the current rules,1 felonies must 
be prosecuted by grand jury indictment,2 but a misdemeanor 
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 1. Under federal law, a felony is a crime punishable by more than one year 
imprisonment; crimes with lesser terms are misdemeanors. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3559(a) (2012). FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) provides: 
(1) Felony. An offense (other than criminal contempt) must be prose-
cuted by an indictment if it is punishable: 
  (A) by death; or 
  (B) by imprisonment for more than one year. 
(2) Misdemeanor. An offense punishable by imprisonment for one year 
or less may be prosecuted in accordance with Rule 58(b)(1). 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(1) provides: “The trial of a misdemeanor may proceed on 
an indictment, information, or complaint. The trial of a petty offense may also 
proceed on a citation or violation notice.” See also United States v. Rojo, 
727 F.2d 1415, 1416–17 (9th Cir. 1983) (“On the one hand, the trial of misde-
meanors, other than petty offenses, may proceed on an indictment, information 
or complaint. . . . On the other hand, the trial of a petty offense may proceed on 
a citation or violation notice.”). 
 2. A grand jury indictment is a finding by a body of citizens appointed by 
law that there is probable cause that a particular offense has been committed. 
See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional 
Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1279 (2006); see also 
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may be based on a charge in a prosecutor’s information3 or even 
a ticket issued by a law-enforcement officer with no further re-
view.4 The felony/misdemeanor bright line is not the distinction 
drawn in the Fifth Amendment itself, which provides that “[n]o 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand 
jury.”5 That is, infamous misdemeanors, if there are such things, 
must also be charged by indictment. The Supreme Court has 
held that particular misdemeanors are infamous, and under the 
Court’s tests for infamy, many misdemeanors prosecutable in 
federal court are infamous.6 
The issue is important because of the dramatic increase in 
the number of Americans with criminal records,7 and the sever-
ity of the consequences of even misdemeanor convictions.8 It is 
too easy for police and prosecutors to charge individuals with 
crimes carrying serious consequences. As the Department of Jus-
tice’s investigation of practices in Ferguson, Missouri revealed,9 
misdemeanor charges can effectively turn individuals or entire 
communities into forced laborers, which, after all, is permitted 
under the Thirteenth Amendment after conviction of any 
crime.10 Public and private actors use criminal records to deny a 
 
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (describing the English ori-
gins of the grand jury institution). The Supreme Court held long ago that the 
Grand Jury Clause is not applicable to the states. See Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884). Accordingly, states need not charge any crimes by in-
dictment. 
 3. “An information is a formal charge against the accused, of the offence, 
with such particulars as to time, place, and attendant circumstances as will ap-
prise him of the nature of the charge he is to meet, signed by the public prose-
cutor.” In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 257 (1894). 
 4. See supra note 1. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 6. See infra notes 124–130 and accompanying text. 
 7. MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, WANTED: ACCURATE FBI 
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 2 (2013), http://www.nelp.org/content/ 
uploads/2015/03/Report-Wanted-Accurate-FBI-Background-Checks 
-Employment.pdf (noting that the FBI “maintains criminal history records on 
more than 75 million individuals”). 
 8. See infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FER-
GUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_ 
department_report.pdf. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their ju-
risdiction.”). 
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range of benefits and opportunities. Even if a charge does not 
lead to conviction, a person could be deported, evicted, have a 
license suspended, or child custody disrupted, or suffer adverse 
employment actions.11 
Lack of precharge screening by a grand jury has serious con-
sequences for federal misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are much 
more likely to be dismissed without trial than felonies; that is, 
upon further examination, courts or prosecutors conclude that 
many misdemeanors do not actually merit prosecution.12 As a 
result of the lack of precharge screening, thousands of people 
every year who never should have been charged nevertheless 
wind up with criminal records, albeit only for a misdemeanor 
charge.13 
Advocating increased use of grand juries may seem odd be-
cause the institution has been criticized in recent years for its 
lack of transparency, particularly in cases involving shootings by 
police officers.14 Furthermore, the grand jury is often accused of 
 
 11. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 809 (2015); see 
also infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text. 
 13. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ AN-
NUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 15 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/usao/legacy/2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf (providing statistics for misdemeanor 
plea, dismissal, and conviction rates in 2013 in U.S. District Court in the Dis-
trict of Columbia). 
 14. See, e.g., Kristin Henning, Status, Race and the Rule of Law in the 
Grand Jury, 58 HOW. L.J. 833, 843 (2015) (“Reform is essential not only be-
cause prosecutorial manipulation has helped exonerate police officers in the 
killing of black and brown men, but also because the grand jury has been used 
so unevenly across race, class, and professional status and has failed to provide 
even the most basic due process protections for most criminal defendants who 
are disproportionately people of color.”); Colin Taylor Ross, Policing Pontius Pi-
late: Police Violence, Local Prosecutors, and Legitimacy, 53 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 755, 761 (2016). See generally Blanche Bong Cook, Biased and Broken 
Bodies of Proof: White Heteropatriarchy, the Grand Jury Process, and Perfor-
mance on Unarmed Black Flesh, 85 UMKC L. REV. 567 (2017) (focusing specif-
ically on the grand jury proceeding in the shooting death of Michael Brown); 
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of Unjustified 
Police Killings—Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397 
(2017) (arguing for prohibition of grand juries in police shooting cases); Ric Sim-
mons, The Role of the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury in Police Use of Deadly 
Force Cases: Restoring the Grand Jury to Its Original Purpose, 65 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 519 (2017) (comparing grand juries in three different police use of force 
cases); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Restoring Independence to the Grand Jury: A 
Victim Advocate for Police Use of Force Cases, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 535 (2017) 
(arguing that victim advocates should represent the interests of the complain-
ant before the grand jury in police violence cases). 
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being under the control of the prosecutor.15 But these objec-
tions—or at least the remedy proposed to address them—apply 
principally to state criminal-justice systems. In the states, there 
is a potential alternative to a grand jury that is more public and 
transparent. Felonies can be charged through a grand jury in-
dictment or a preliminary hearing  
which involves the prosecutor presenting evidence in an open court-
room proceeding in an effort to persuade a judge that probable cause 
exists to hold a defendant over for trial. Unlike in the grand jury, pre-
liminary hearings allow defense counsel to be present, cross-examine 
government witnesses, and challenge the prosecution’s evidence.16 
In the federal system, charging serious crimes by a prelimi-
nary hearing or any other more accountable method would re-
quire a constitutional amendment to eliminate the grand jury 
requirement, not mere adjustment of policy.17 Accordingly, in 
the federal system, the choice is not between grand juries and 
preliminary hearings, but between grand juries and direct filing 
of charges by prosecutors or police with no non-law-enforcement 
review whatsoever. And consideration by a grand jury, imperfect 
as it is, is more transparent and independent than the unilateral 
decision of an individual prosecutor or law enforcement officer. 
Part I of this Article explains that serious consequences may 
fall on people convicted of federal misdemeanors.18 These include 
deportation, sex offender or other criminal registration, loss of 
civil rights, and penalties flowing from the permanent change of 
legal status caused by criminal conviction.19 Misdemeanor con-
victions and criminal records may also give rise to profound 
stigma, resulting in exclusion from a variety of benefits and op-
portunities conferred by the government and private parties.20 
Part II outlines the jurisprudence of the Grand Jury Clause, 
pursuant to which the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries rebuffed attempts by the Department 
of Justice to prosecute serious misdemeanor offenses by infor-
mation.21 The principle coming out of the decisions, consistent 
 
 15. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 16. Fairfax, supra note 14, at 401–02. 
 17. Alternatively, federal prosecutors could be required both to present 
cases to a grand jury and to have a preliminary hearing. Presumably the De-
partment of Justice would strenuously object to this elaborate process, and Con-
gress seems unlikely to require it. 
 18. See infra notes 36–47 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 121–134 and accompanying text. 
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with the drafting history, is that offenses potentially resulting in 
stigmatizing punishments must be prosecuted by grand jury in-
dictment.22 A stigmatizing punishment is one that degrades the 
offender’s status, indicating that the person is less than a full 
member of the community.23 Stigmatizing punishments include 
corporal punishment, incarceration in a prison or penitentiary 
as opposed to a jail, loss of civil rights or imposition of civil disa-
bilities, and convictions implying moral turpitude.24 The Su-
preme Court also made clear that what is infamous changes from 
era to era, as the social meaning of stigma evolves.25 
The Court’s early cases hold that many misdemeanors 
should be charged by grand jury indictment,26 but that is not the 
practice today.27 Federal sentencing statutes now permit impris-
onment for all misdemeanors, and permit any sentence of incar-
ceration to be served in a prison.28 That the U.S. Code allows 
misdemeanor sentences to be served in prisons may well be a 
drafting mistake, made in ignorance of the constitutional conse-
quences;29 if so, it could be easily corrected. But until then, all 
federal misdemeanors should be prosecuted only by grand jury 
indictment because all misdemeanors carry potential prison sen-
tences.30 
Several other categories of misdemeanors require grand 
jury indictment. All drug offenses may be punished by serious 
collateral consequences, which include loss or restriction of pro-
fessional licenses, ineligibility for public funds, including welfare 
benefits and student loans, loss of voting rights, ineligibility for 
jury duty, and deportation.31 Misdemeanors involving moral tur-
pitude or crimen falsi may be used for impeachment if the person 
 
 22. See infra notes 83–120 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 135–191 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 124–130 and accompanying text. 
 27. See supra note 1. 
 28. See infra notes 143–145 and accompanying text. 
 29. That is, we can assume that Congress did not intend to require all mis-
demeanors to be subject to grand jury indictment, because they did not so pro-
vide. See supra note 1. Yet, we cannot lightly assume that Congress deliberately 
violated the Constitution by providing for infamous punishment in the absence 
of grand jury indictment. Accordingly, a plausible, logical explanation is igno-
rance of this relatively obscure area of constitutional law. 
 30. See infra notes 135–152 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. For a more detailed discus-
sion of drug offenses and collateral consequences, see Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the 
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convicted testifies in court or to find the absence of good moral 
character if the person seeks a professional license, such as to 
practice law.32 Many sex offenses classified as misdemeanors re-
quire registration.33 And some misdemeanors can result in loss 
of civil rights.34 Because the accusation of an offense resulting in 
loss of status is stigmatizing, all misdemeanors carrying these 
consequences must be prosecuted by indictment. 
More thoughtful evaluation of these cases by a grand jury 
before charge would likely result in the nonprosecution of many 
cases because current rates of postcharge dismissal are high. If 
prosecutors were to charge fewer meritless cases due to the 
grand jury process, thousands of Americans would avoid the 
stigma of a criminal record in cases where it is unwarranted. The 
Framers drafted the Constitution to prevent precisely what is 
now occurring—the casual charging of serious offenses.35 
I.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF MISDEMEANORS   
Misdemeanor offenses and convictions are generally consid-
ered to be less serious than felony offenses and convictions.36 
Thus, Justices have noted the special significance of felony con-
victions. For example, Justice Clark noted that a felony convic-
tion “strips an offender of all civil rights and leaves a shattered 
character that only a presidential pardon can mend.”37 Chief 
Justice Warren wrote that “[c]onviction of a felony imposes a sta-
tus upon a person which not only makes him vulnerable to future 
sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also 
seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.”38 
Given this perceived distinction between the weighty felony and 
 
War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253 (2002). 
 32. See infra notes 179–191 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 153–172 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra Part II.A. 
 36. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970) (“[A] felony conviction is 
more serious than a misdemeanor conviction.”); see also Boyde v. California, 
494 U.S. 370, 400 n.80 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[S]erious offenses’ such 
as murder, manslaughter, rape, and arson came to be called felonies, whereas 
other, presumably ‘less serious’ offenses, came to be called misdemeanors.” (cit-
ing 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 17, at 81 (14th ed. 1978))). 
 37. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 358 (1960) (Clark, J., dissent-
ing). 
 38. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); 
see also Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015) (“For life, [Yates] 
will bear the stigma of having a federal felony conviction.”). 
 2018] INFAMOUS MISDEMEANORS 1917 
 
a misdemeanor, in the federal system misdemeanors may be 
prosecuted by information, without action by a grand jury, but 
felonies require indictment.39 
The distinction between misdemeanors and felonies, how-
ever, turns out to be evanescent. It is, of course, conceivable that 
misdemeanors could actually be categorically less serious than 
felonies in terms of punishment or other legal consequences.40 
For example, the Model Penal Code provides that some catego-
ries of offenses may not give rise to collateral consequences.41 
Congress could, likewise, ensure that federal misdemeanors are 
less significant than felonies. However, the principle that misde-
meanors are or should be less serious than felonies is not a bind-
ing legal command, and, if it ever was, is not currently applied 
in practice. A century ago, the D.C. Circuit wrote: “The old dis-
tinction between felonies and misdemeanors at the common law 
is practically impossible of definition. What is denounced as an 
infamous crime is practically a felony in its consequence, though 
it may be called a misdemeanor in the statute.”42 More recently, 
Professor Jenny Roberts explained “[t]here is . . . no longer such 
a thing as a ‘slap on the wrist.’ All convictions, even for the most 
minor of charges, come with a long list of ‘collateral conse-
quences.’”43 
 
 39. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 40. Cf. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. 
REV. 1055 (2015) (arguing that while decriminalization of misdemeanors may 
provide relief for overcrowded jails and an overburdened defense bar, it actually 
expands the reach of the criminal apparatus by making it easier to impose fines 
and supervision). 
 41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“An offense defined 
by this Code or by any other statute of this State constitutes a violation if it is 
so designated in this Code or in the law defining the offense or if no other sen-
tence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty is authorized upon 
conviction or if it is defined by a statute other than this Code that now provides 
that the offense shall not constitute a crime. A violation does not constitute a 
crime and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal 
disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.”). 
 42. Chambers v. Buroughs, 44 App. D.C. 168, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1915). 
 43. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1089, 1126 (2013). Professor Alexandra Natapoff noted that “[o]nce con-
victed, petty offenders suffer some of the same consequences as their felony 
counterparts.” Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 
1327 (2012); see also, e.g., David P. Baugh, The Consequences of Criminal Con-
victions for Misdemeanor or Felony Offenses, 18 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. 
JUST. 55, 71 (2011) (“A criminal record, either for a misdemeanor or a felony, is 
a blemish for life. No one can ever reach his or her full potential to contribute 
to society or to reach some level of self-satisfaction and fulfillment with a crim-
inal record. A jail sentence can last for months or years; a criminal record is a 
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Legislatures now regularly impose punishments for partic-
ular misdemeanors equal to or exceeding those for felonies and 
attach serious collateral consequences to misdemeanors. For ex-
ample, counterintuitively, a conviction for a misdemeanor of-
fense may constitute a statutory aggravated felony, triggering 
mandatory deportation44 or sentencing enhancement.45 Misde-
meanor sex offenses can lead to sex offender registration.46 The 
Supreme Court recently recognized the pervasive consequences 
of a criminal conviction: 
[Criminal sanctions] can include not only fines and imprisonment, but 
all the attendant consequences of being branded a criminal: depriva-
tion of otherwise protected civil rights, such as the right to bear arms 
or vote in elections; loss of employment opportunities; social stigma; 
and severe disabilities in other controversies, such as custody or immi-
gration disputes.47 
 
restriction on a person’s future that lasts for life.”); Erica Hashimoto, The Prob-
lem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1041 
(2013) (“To be sure, criminal convictions, including misdemeanor convictions, 
can have significant life-altering consequences for the defendant regardless of 
the sentence imposed as a result of the conviction.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463, 466 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[A] state 
misdemeanor conviction can qualify as a federal ‘aggravated felony.’”); United 
States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A] misdemeanor may, in 
some cases and consistent with legislative intent, fall within the INA’s defini-
tion of ‘aggravated felony.’”); cf. Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 491 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s reading sweeps a wide variety of fed-
eral, state, and local tax offenses—including misdemeanors—into the ‘aggra-
vated felony’ category.”). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Cabrera, 604 F. App’x 889, 891 (11th 
Cir. 2015) (“[A] theft or burglary conviction that is a misdemeanor under state 
law but results in a term of imprisonment of at least one year is an ‘aggravated 
felony’” under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMM’N 2016)); United States v. Villafana, 577 F. App’x 248, 250 (5th Cir. 
2014) (“Villafana’s prior conviction for misdemeanor forgery qualified as an ag-
gravated felony for purposes of a sentence enhancement.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 544 (Ariz. 2008) (“[M]isde-
meanor crimes involving sexual motivation are serious offenses and [we] hold 
that when a special allegation of sexual motivation exposes a defendant to the 
possibility of sex offender registration, Article 2, Section 24 of our Constitution 
entitles the defendant to a trial by jury.”); People v. King, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 
223 (Ct. App. 1993) (“We do not, however, consider the mandatory registration 
penalty for misdemeanor violations of section 314 to be facially or inherently 
unconstitutional.”); People v. Mann, 859 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (App. Div. 2008) 
(“The misdemeanor counts arose from defendant touching the breasts of fe-
males ages 13 and younger, which would constitute the crime of sexual abuse 
in the second degree if committed in New York (see Penal Law § 130.60[2]), and 
is a registrable offense under SORA.”). 
 47. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 573 (2012); see also, 
e.g., Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985) (“[C]onviction may be used 
to impeach the defendant’s credibility and certainly carries the societal stigma 
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Tellingly, the Justices did not distinguish between felonies and 
misdemeanors; all of the hardships they list can fall on misde-
meanants. 
Misdemeanors in the U.S. Code involve every sort of dishon-
orable and morally reprehensible conduct, including conspir-
acy;48 theft;49 embezzlement;50 fraud;51 false statement;52 false 
claims;53 forgery;54 bribery;55 and disloyalty.56 The Code also in-
cludes a number of misdemeanor drug offenses.57 In addition, 
under the Assimilative Crimes Act,58 acts that occur on federal 
enclaves but violate state law are prosecuted in federal court. 
The Act assimilates misdemeanor sex offenses.59 Misdemeanors, 
like felonies, appear on criminal background checks and there-
fore can affect many areas of public and private life.60 “Employ-
ers often decline to interview people who have been convicted of 
any offense; 60 to 70 percent of employers state that they would 
not hire any ex-offender and the majority of employers perform 
background checks.”61 To use Justice Clark’s phrase, one’s char-
acter can be shattered as much by a misdemeanor conviction as 
by a felony.62 
In addition to their effects on individuals, misdemeanor con-
victions have substantial social and political consequences. From 
 
accompanying any criminal conviction.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 
(1976) (“But given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitu-
tionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and 
subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confine-
ment do not otherwise violate the Constitution.”). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
 49. Id. § 655 (theft by bank examiner); id. § 656 (theft by bank officer or 
employee). 
 50. Id. § 1163 (embezzlement or theft from Indian tribal organization). 
 51. Id. § 1920 (false statement or fraud to obtain Federal Employees’ Com-
pensation); id. § 1923 (fraudulent receipt of payments); 26 U.S.C. § 7207 (2012) 
(tax fraud). 
 52. 18 U.S.C. § 1025 (false pretenses on the high seas). 
 53. Id. § 288 (false claims for postal losses). 
 54. Id. § 510(c) (forging endorsements on Treasury checks). 
 55. Id. § 597 (expenditures to influence voting). 
 56. Id. § 1918. Shainghaiing sailors should be a crime of moral turpitude, 
if it is not. Id. § 2194. 
 57. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) (2012) (distributing marijuana); id. § 844 (simple 
possession). 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 13. 
 59. United States v. Cox, 929 F.2d 1511, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 60. JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 97–98 (2015). 
 61. Natapoff, supra note 43, at 1325. 
 62. See Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 358 (1960) (Clark, J., dis-
senting). 
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the end of Reconstruction until as late as the 1960s, various ju-
risdictions used vague misdemeanor statutes punishing crimes 
such as vagrancy to extract labor from African Americans and to 
control disfavored groups using the veneer of law.63 Low-level 
offenses continue to be used by the criminal-justice apparatus 
for financial ends.64 Professors Wayne Logan and Ronald Wright 
report that surcharges and fees associated with offenses, what 
they call LFOs (legal financial obligations) “often have debilitat-
ing consequences for individuals.”65 They note “[r]ecent aca-
demic work and advocacy group studies have condemned LFOs 
for their economically regressive impact on poor defendants, the 
barriers they present to reentry, and the racial disparities they 
reflect.”66 Because “criminal justice actors increasingly rely on 
the income from LFOs to fund ordinary system operations,” they 
have “become mercenaries, in effect working on commission.”67 
A disturbing example was revealed by a Department of Jus-
tice investigation in Ferguson, Missouri, following the death of 
eighteen-year-old Michael Brown, who was killed after an en-
counter with a Ferguson Police Department (FPD) officer.68 The 
Department of Justice reported that “[t]he Ferguson municipal 
court handles most charges brought by FPD, and does so not 
with the primary goal of administering justice or protecting the 
rights of the accused, but of maximizing revenue.”69 
Notwithstanding their importance, for a range of structural 
reasons, misdemeanors are more likely to be erroneously 
charged than felonies. First, prosecutors may not screen misde-
meanor cases closely. “In the world of petty offenses, the prose-
cutorial screening function is . . . weaker, [and] in some realms 
nonexistent. Prosecutors often charge whatever petty offense the 
police report describes and back off, if at all, only later during 
 
 63. Gabriel J. Chin, The Jena Six and the History of Racially Compromised 
Justice in Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 391 (2009). See generally 
RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 
AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016) (discussing breadth of police authority in 
the mid-twentieth century). 
 64. See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANC-
TIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016) (analyzing the ways in which crim-
inal fines entrench the poor). 
 65. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1177. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 5. 
 69. Id. at 42. 
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plea negotiations.”70 Second, because “misdemeanor court judges 
are relatively insulated from higher court feedback and do not 
learn of their mistakes in the same way that felony trial court 
judges do,” there may be more legal errors from the bench.71 Fi-
nally, it is not uncommon for prosecutors and defense attorneys 
handling felonies to specialize in particular sorts of serious 
crimes, becoming reasonably expert in, say, white-collar drug or 
sex offenses.72 This could mean that, when it comes to felony of-
fenses, prosecutors are less likely to charge meritless cases in 
legal areas they know well, and experienced defense attorneys 
are more likely to spot problems early on. On the other hand, 
“misdemeanor attorneys often handle a large variety of crimes, 
codified in a variety of sources.”73 When an attorney has a docket 
that includes traffic and regulatory offenses, as well as lesser 
versions of traditional felonies, it is more difficult to learn the 
nuances of the variety of statutes involved. In addition, junior or 
volunteer attorneys with little knowledge and experience are 
sometimes used for misdemeanor cases.74 For all of these rea-
sons, misdemeanor prosecutors and defense attorneys may be 
less able to identify and screen out problematic cases, and mis-
demeanor charges with a low probability of conviction may move 
forward. 
For these (and perhaps other) reasons, federal misdemeanor 
charges are much more likely than felony charges not to result 
 
 70. Natapoff, supra note 43, at 1338. See generally ROBERT C. BO-
RUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, 
MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR 
COURTS 25–26 (2009) (discussing the over-criminalization of misdemeanors). 
 71. Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor Justice System: Its 
Problems and Some Potential Solutions, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 81 
(2012). 
 72. Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 321, 335 (2002) (noting that “[m]any [prosecutor ’s] offices have 
sought to increase their efficacy by dividing the office into units based on types 
of crimes.”); Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The 
Rise of Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1221, 1229 (2011) (discussing specialization of white collar criminal de-
fense attorneys). 
 73. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy 
in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 305 (2011). 
 74. As Professor Irene Joe has explained: “Aside from a few circumstances, 
public defender administrators do not treat misdemeanor and felony clients 
alike when they are forced to ration limited resources. Instead, decisionmakers 
minimize the resources dedicated to misdemeanor representation so they can 
concentrate their efforts on felony representation.” Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, 
Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 743 (2017). 
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in a conviction. For example, Table 1 shows the percent of mis-
demeanors and felonies that were charged but failed to result in 
a conviction for years 2009 through 2012. 
 
Table 1: Charges Not Leading To Conviction 
 
Year 
Misdemeanors Not 
Leading to Conviction 
Felonies Not Lead-
ing to Conviction 
2009 A 30.5% 6.7% 
2010 B 28.6% 6.1% 
2011 C 29.6% 6.4% 
2012 D 31.1% 6.6% 
 
  A. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 233464, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009–STATISTICAL TABLES 18–19 tbl.4.2 (2011), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09st.pdf. 
  B. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239914, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2010–STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.4.2 (2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs10st.pdf. 
  C. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248469, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2011–STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.4.2 (2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs11st.pdf. 
  D. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248470, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012–STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.4.2 (2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf. 
 
Thus from 2009 through 2012, misdemeanants were be-
tween four and five times as likely to be charged but not con-
victed compared to felons. 
II.  DEFINING INFAMOUS CRIMES   
The Supreme Court’s Grand Jury Clause jurisprudence in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests, con-
sistent with the drafting history of the Constitution, that of-
fenses potentially resulting in stigmatizing punishments must 
be prosecuted by grand jury indictment—but that is not the rule 
today. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now employ a 
bright line rule: Felonies must be charged by indictment, in the 
absence of a defendant’s waiver of their grand jury right, but 
misdemeanors need not be considered by a grand jury.75 But the 
Fifth Amendment does not mention felonies or misdemeanors. 
Instead, the textual requirement is that “capital, or otherwise 
 
 75. See supra note 1. 
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infamous crime[s]” must be charged by indictment.76 The Su-
preme Court has specifically rejected the felony/misdemeanor 
distinction as the dividing line, holding that misdemeanors hav-
ing the quality of infamy must be charged by indictment.77 
A. STIGMA AND INFAMOUS CRIMES 
Understanding the purpose of the grand jury illuminates 
the problem the Framers were trying to solve, and therefore 
what an infamous crime might be. The structure of the Bill of 
Rights reveals that the grand jury does not exist primarily to 
ensure that only the guilty are ultimately convicted and pun-
ished. The Constitution guards against wrongful conviction and 
punishment through rights associated with the ultimate fact-
finding process, such as the right to counsel, and the right to a 
jury trial.78 The standard for indictment by grand jury is proba-
ble cause, a minimal threshold, which prevents few, if any, prov-
ably guilty people from being charged.79 The grand jury require-
ment, therefore, offers little comfort to the provably guilty; they 
will be indicted.80 
To be sure, grand juries have discretion not to indict, or to 
indict for a lesser rather than greater crime.81 But it is said that 
 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 77. See infra notes 126–133 and accompanying text. 
 78. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“Our society has a high degree of confidence in its criminal trials, in no small 
part because the Constitution offers unparalleled protections against convicting 
the innocent.” (citing id. at 398–99, and listing presumption of innocence, proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the rights to confrontation, compulsory process, 
assistance of effective counsel, and disclosure of exculpatory evidence, but not 
grand jury indictment)). 
 79. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 586 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“For 
the provision of indictment by grand jury does not protect innocent defendants 
from unjust convictions. Rather, it helps to assure that innocent persons will 
not be made unjustly to stand trial at all.”); see also United States v. R. Enter-
prises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (stating that the purpose of grand jury 
investigation is “to ascertain whether probable cause exists.”). 
 80. The percentage of defendants for whom there would be legally sufficient 
evidence of guilt after a trial, yet for whom there is insufficient probable cause 
to obtain a grand jury indictment, is zero in theory and likely near zero in prac-
tice. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 67 (1986) (“We believe that the 
petit jury’s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrates a fortiori 
that there was probable cause to charge the defendants with the offenses for 
which they were convicted.”). 
 81. As the Court explained: 
The grand jury does not determine only that probable cause exists to 
believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In the 
hands of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or a 
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the prosecutor has a great deal of control over grand juries, and 
that a grand jury “would ‘indict a ham sandwich if asked to do 
so.’”82 Further, there is no evidence that grand juries regularly 
decline to indict in the face of solid evidence in a case the prose-
cutor wants to pursue. 
A key function, perhaps the key function, of the grand jury 
is to prevent unwarranted stigmatization of people who would 
later be acquitted.83 Thus scholars including Akhil Amar84 and 
 
lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps most 
significant of all, a capital offense or a noncapital offense—all on the 
basis of the same facts. Moreover, “[t]he grand jury is not bound to in-
dict in every case where a conviction can be obtained.” United States v. 
Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
Thus, even if a grand jury’s determination of probable cause is con-
firmed in hindsight by a conviction on the indicted offense, that confir-
mation in no way suggests that the discrimination did not impermissi-
bly infect the framing of the indictment and, consequently, the nature 
or very existence of the proceedings to come. 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986); see also United States v. Cotton, 
535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002) (“Respondents emphasize that the Fifth Amendment 
grand jury right serves a vital function in providing for a body of citizens that 
acts as a check on prosecutorial power. No doubt that is true.”). 
 82. Josh Levin, The Judge Who Coined “Indict a Ham Sandwich” Was Him-
self Indicted, SLATE (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon_valley/ 
2014/11/25/sol_wachtler_the_judge_who_coined_indict_a_ham_sandwich_was_ 
himself_indicted.html. Some have challenged this view, arguing that state 
grand juries do exercise discretion. Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand 
Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 1, 35 (2002) (“Similarly, in the early 1980s statistics showed that New York 
grand juries dismissed approximately 10% of their cases and reduced charges 
in almost as many.”). Others have persuasively argued for expanding the power 
of the grand jury to exercise discretion as the voice of the community. Kevin K. 
Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2346 (2008) 
(“[T]he grand jury may have one important responsibility that suggests that its 
role is to review the sufficiency of the evidence for indictments. But the histori-
cal narrative also suggests some other roles and responsibilities: considering 
the legitimacy of laws, and/or considering the legitimacy of the application of 
those laws in a particular case.”). 
 83. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1973) (concluding that a 
grand jury is “a means of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, 
whether it comes from government, or be prompted by partisan passion or pri-
vate enmity”; Commonwealth v. Harris, 121 N.E. 409, 410 (Mass. 1919) (“[T]hat 
the twelfth article of the Bill of Rights in part was aimed and intended to pro-
hibit the scandal and disgrace of a trial in public of persons charged with infa-
mous crimes and offences when, in truth, there was no sufficient cause to sus-
pect their guilt.”); cf. Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 
219 (1979) (explaining that one reason for secrecy of grand jury proceedings is 
to “assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will 
not be held up to public ridicule”). 
 84. Professor Amar explained: 
[T]o make full sense of the text, we must focus on the harms inherent 
in every criminal accusation. Every criminal accusation, of course, is 
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Stephanos Bibas85 agree that the grand jury serves to prevent 
charging people against whom there is so little evidence of guilt 
that reputation rather than liberty is at stake. The Framers of 
the Constitution took honor and reputation seriously.86 One 
early federal judge explained that: 
[English] laws have wisely and humanely considered, that next to the 
disgrace of being convicted of an infamous offence, is the dishonour of 
being charged with one; and therefore, before they would submit a sub-
ject to the danger and inconvenience of being publicly arraigned, an 
impartial jury are on their oaths to declare the just cause for accusa-
tion.87 
Other courts agree that “[t]he Grand Jury is a safeguard de-
signed to protect the reputation of the accused, to avert the 
 
an attack on the accused’s reputation——a charge of “criminal” wrong-
doing in the words of the Speedy Trial Clause, of “infamous” miscon-
duct in the analogous words of the Grand Jury Clause. At common law, 
a false accusation of criminal behavior was viewed as defamation per 
se. (Note the obvious etymological link between defamation and accu-
sations of infamous crime). And as with pretrial detention, each addi-
tional day of accusation was a fresh assault, a new injury. Here too, the 
innocent man would want a trial to speedily follow accusation, so that 
he could offer his “answer” and put on his “defence.” And if the innocent 
man can prevail at this speedy, public, and fair trial, he puts an end to 
the accusation of infamy and wins back his good name. 
Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 661 
(1996). 
 85. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhance-
ments in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1182 (2001) (“Juries were 
meant to check the imposition of stigma, as reflected in the Grand Jury Clause’s 
limitation to ‘infamous’ crimes.”). 
 86. One famous example of the importance of reputation in Western culture 
comes from literature. In Shakespeare’s Othello, Iago says to Othello: 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls: 
Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing; 
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed. 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3. sc. 3. The Milkovich Court quoted the 
same excerpt during its discussion of the development of defamation law. See 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (describing one purpose 
of defamation law as “obtaining redress for harm caused by [false] statements”). 
Even an acquittal is no substitute for being subjected to baseless charges: “For-
mer Secretary of Labor, Ray Donovan, famously asked after his acquittal in a 
1987 corruption trial, ‘Where do I go to get my reputation back?’” Frederick 
Lawrence, Declaring Innocence: Use of Declaratory Judgments to Vindicate the 
Wrongly Convicted, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 391, 399 (2009). 
 87. United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 838 (D.S.C. 1799). 
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stigma of prosecution unless there is reasonable ground for pro-
ceeding.88 
The drafting history of the Bill of Rights also suggests that 
the grand jury is concerned with pretrial stigma, not postconvic-
tion punishment. Introduced by James Madison on June 8, 1789, 
at the first session of the House of Representatives, the Amend-
ment originally read: “In all crimes punishable with loss of life 
or member, presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall be 
an essential preliminary.”89 Thus the initial focus was on pun-
ishment and for a limited number of crimes. This draft went to 
 
 88. United States v. Echols, 413 F. Supp. 8, 9 n.2 (E.D. La. 1975) (quoting 
Note, Quashing Federal Indictments Returned Upon Incompetent Evidence, 
62 HARV. L. REV. 111, 114 (1948)); see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 
757, 762 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he infamy of the punishment is essentially a meas-
ure of the infamy attached to the offender: by authorizing an infamous punish-
ment, the Congress indicates that it believes the offender deserving of infamy.”); 
Gardes v. United States, 87 F. 172, 185 (5th Cir. 1898) (describing imprison-
ment as “stamp[ing] the convict with the stigma of subjection to an infamous 
punishment.”); United States v. Nott, 27 F. Cas. 189, 192 (C.C.D. Ohio 1839) 
(“The law had been violated and its penalty incurred. You must be cut off from 
society; and from your nearest and dearest connections. You must put on the 
badges of disgrace, and be associated with men rendered infamous by crime.”); 
Grinbaum v. Superior Court ex rel. S.F., 221 P. 635, 646 (Cal. 1923) (“As such 
an appointment [of a conservator] takes from the person the possession and 
control of his property and even his freedom of person, and commits his prop-
erty, his person, his liberty to another, stamps him with the stigma of insanity 
and degrades him in public estimation, no more important order touching a man 
can be made, short of conviction of infamous crime.”; In re Request of Governor 
for Advisory Op., 950 A.2d 651, 657 (Del. 2008) (“An act of civil delinquency by 
a juvenile, to which the General Assembly intentionally avoided attaching per-
manent stigma, is incompatible with the concept of an ‘infamous crime.’”); State 
v. Kearney, 8 N.C. 53, 54 (1820) (stating it is still true, generally, that “public 
corporal punishment for any offence impresses an indelible stigma on the char-
acter, and ought to be inflicted on those offences only which are infamous in 
their nature.”). 
 89. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 424 (1885) (emphasis added); see Roger 
A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 398, 458 (2006) (stating that there was minimal discussion during the 
ratification debates in regard to grand juries); see also THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 265 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1788) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS] 
(James Madison argued that Article III, Section Two, should contain a provision 
stating that “presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall be an essential 
preliminary” to criminal cases); GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY app. J-1, at 318 (1995) (including selected sec-
tions of James Madison’s proposals to the House of Representatives on June 8, 
1789). “Delegate Aedanus Burke of South Carolina was particularly adamant 
that the Constitution prohibit prosecutions from being initiated by infor-
mation.” Fairfax, supra, at 412 n.58. 
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the Committee of the Whole.90 The following month, new lan-
guage was suggested by Roger Sherman: “No person shall be 
tried for any crime whereby he may incur loss of life or any infa-
mous punishment, without Indictment by a grand Jury . . . .”91 A 
report from the House Committee of Eleven—proposed at the 
same time as Sherman’s recommendation—read, “[N]o person 
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment by a grand jury 
. . . .”92 That version became, and has remained, part of the Con-
stitution.93 
The drafting history reflects expansion of the coverage of the 
Clause. The original version limited the grand jury indictment 
requirement to crimes involving punishments of loss of life or 
limb.94 Roger Sherman’s version changed the requirement to in-
clude capital or infamous punishments, even if there was no ex-
ecution or amputation—a clear extension.95 The Framers chose 
a third version linked to the capital or otherwise infamous na-
ture of the crime; that is, a prosecutor could not avoid the neces-
sity of seeking an indictment by committing in advance not to 
impose certain punishments.96 The Framers also advanced the 
relevant time period: Sherman’s draft required an indictment 
before trial,97 whereas the enacted version moved the require-
ment back to the earlier step of being “held to answer.”98 This 
drafting sequence is consistent with the idea that what is at 
stake, what the Amendment regulates, is impairment of reputa-
tion and not imposition of punishment. 
 
 90. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759–60 (1789–1790). 
 91. COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 266 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 267 (emphasis added). 
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 94. See COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 265 (“The trial of all 
crimes . . . shall be by an impartial jury . . . [with] all crimes punishable with 
loss of life or limb . . . .”). 
 95. See id. at 266 (providing Sherman’s proposal regarding the Grand Jury 
Clause). 
 96. The Supreme Court now holds that a person charged with a misde-
meanor punishable by incarceration is not entitled to counsel if the prosecutor 
and court agree that incarceration is off the table. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 
367, 369 (1979); see also Russell Christopher, Penalizing and Chilling an Indi-
gent’s Exercise of the Right to Appointed Counsel for Misdemeanors, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 1905 (2014) (“In Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme Court clarified that even 
those charged with misdemeanors in which imprisonment is an authorized pun-
ishment are not necessarily constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel.”). 
 97. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 98. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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The Court has indicated that a punishment that “always im-
plies disgrace” is infamous.99 Dictionaries at the time of the 
framing of the Constitution also understood infamy in reputa-
tional terms, defining infamy as “[p]ublick reproach; notoriety of 
bad character,”100 and infamous as “of evil report, scandalous, 
base.”101 Over the past two centuries, the dictionary definition 
has not changed. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines infa-
mous as: “well-known for being bad[;] known for evil acts or 
crimes[;] causing people to think you are bad or evil.”102 
There is a clear reason for the Amendment’s concern with 
reputation. As a Harvard Law Review article explained, “[i]t has 
long been considered slander per se orally to accuse one of a 
crime involving ‘moral turpitude’ or subject to an ‘infamous pun-
ishment.’”103 Many courts have held that a statement is actiona-
ble without proof of special damages if it “would subject the party 
charged to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, 
or subject her to infamous punishment.”104 At the time of the 
 
 99. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 169 (1890). 
 100. Infamy, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1086 (1755); see 2 A 
COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 41 (4th ed. 1797). 
 101. Infamous, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 447 
(26th ed. 1789). 
 102. Infamous MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam 
-webster.com/dictionary/infamous (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
 103. Note, Developments in the Law—Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 887 
n.73 (1956); see FRANCIS M. BURDICK, LAW OF TORTS 372 n.57 (4th ed. 1926); 
Roscellus S. Guernsey, When a Libel Is Not a Libel, 20 YALE L.J. 36, 39 (1910) 
(“A misdemeanor is ordinarily not punishable by an infamous punishment; 
hence, in order that a charge of such offense may be actionable per se, it is nec-
essary that it be indictable and involve moral turpitude. A charge of petit lar-
ceny is not a libel if false, unless it is a misdemeanor under the penal code.”); 
Libel and Slander—Privileged Communication, 23 YALE L.J. 99, 99 (1913) 
(“Words which charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime involving 
moral turpitude or subjecting the offender to infamous punishment are slander-
ous per se.”); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 124 (“[W]ith regard to words that do not thus apparently, and upon 
the face of them, import such defamation as will of course be injurious, it is 
necessary that the plaintiff should aver some particular damage to have hap-
pened . . . .”); P.J.T., Torts—Slander—Words Actionable Per Se, 10 TEX. L. 
REV. 390, 391 (1932) (“[W]ords are actionable per se when the offense which 
they charge renders the party liable to an indictment for a crime involving moral 
turpitude or subjecting him to infamous punishment.” (citing Pollard v. Lyon, 
91 U.S. 225, 226 (1876))). 
 104. Butler v. Carter & Russell Pub. Co., 135 F. 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1905); see, 
e.g., Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188, 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (“The rule seems 
to be, that where the charge, if true, will subject the party charged to an indict-
ment for a crime, involving moral turpitude, or subject him to an infamous pun-
ishment, then the words are in themselves actionable.”); Shipp v. McCraw, 7 
N.C. 463, 466 (1819) (Henderson, J., concurring) (“The gravamen in an action 
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framing, as now, prosecutors were immune from suit for their 
charging decisions.105 Accordingly, allowing the prosecution of 
offenses affecting reputation by information would permit accu-
sations, which the law recognized as intrinsically damaging, but 
with no legal recourse if they turned out to be unwarranted.106 
Since at least some charges would be baseless, unaccountable 
prosecutorial freedom would have been unjust. 
That the Grand Jury Clause was designed to avoid unwar-
ranted stigma suggests that it should be contextual; the Court 
has recognized that “[w]hat punishments shall be considered as 
infamous may be affected by the changes of public opinion from 
one age to another.”107 And because the interest at stake is rep-
utational, it does not matter whether the stigmatizing punish-
ment is actually imposed: “[I]n determining whether the crime 
is infamous, the question is whether it is one for which the stat-
ute authorizes the court to award an infamous punishment, and 
not whether the punishment ultimately awarded is an infamous 
 
of slander, is social degradation. The risk of punishment, and the rule to test 
the question whether the words be or be not actionable, to wit: does the charge 
impute an infamous crime, is resorted to, to ascertain the fact, whether it be a 
social degradation, and not whether the risk of punishment be incurred. And 
this rule is the test of that; for those who are punished for infamous crimes are 
degraded from their rank as citizens, they lose their privileges as freemen, their 
liberam legem, and are no longer boni et legales homines.”); Boucher v. Clark 
Pub. Co., 84 N.W. 237, 238 (S.D. 1900) (“Any publication which imputes to a 
person the commission of a criminal offense, which will, in case the imputation 
or charge is true, subject the party charged to punishment for a crime involving 
moral turpitude, or subject such party to an infamous punishment, is actionable 
. . . .”); Redway v. Gray, 31 Vt. 292, 297 (1858) (“They impute an infamous 
crime, involving moral turpitude, and subject the person guilty of such an of-
fence to corporal punishment, and it has always been held, that when all these 
concur, the words are actionable per se.”). 
 105. See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 
2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 53, 81 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court found “the 
common-law rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity to be ‘well settled’” (quot-
ing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–28 (1976))). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 351 (1886); see Ex parte Wilson, 
114 U.S. 417, 427–28 (1885) (“In former times, being put in the stocks was not 
considered as necessarily infamous. And by the first Judiciary Act of the United 
States, whipping was classed with moderate fines and short terms of imprison-
ment . . . . But at the present day either stocks or whipping might be thought 
an infamous punishment.”). 
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one.”108 An accusation of conduct warranting degrading sanc-
tions if a conviction were to occur is sufficient to trigger the 
Clause.109 
The reasons for the Grand Jury Clause, and therefore the 
tests for infamy, differ from other criminal law entitlements. For 
example, the right to appointed counsel for an indigent person 
charged with a misdemeanor depends on whether there is the 
possibility of actual incarceration.110 The right to trial by jury for 
a misdemeanor depends on whether punishment of more than 
six months is authorized.111 Both of these turn on trial outcome 
and seriousness of the effects of conviction, not the reputational 
effect of an accusation as such.112 
The purpose of preventing unwarranted stigma helps to ex-
plain why many errors with respect to a grand jury are cured by 
a valid guilty verdict by a trial jury.113 Yet, complete denial of a 
 
 108. In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200, 205 (1891); see Mackin, 117 U.S. at 351 
(“The test is whether the crime is one for which the statutes authorize the court 
to award an infamous punishment, not whether the punishment ultimately 
awarded is an infamous one . . . .”); Wilson, 114 U.S. at 426 (“The question is 
whether the crime is one for which the statutes authorize the court to award an 
infamous punishment, not whether the punishment awarded is an infamous 
one.”). 
 109. Wilson, 114 U.S. at 426 (describing the accused’s right and that it trig-
gers the clause). 
 110. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“We hold, therefore, that 
absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was rep-
resented by counsel at his trial.”). 
 111. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (“So-called petty offenses 
were tried without juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always 
been held to be exempt from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial provisions.”). 
 112. On the other hand, some of these cases nodded to concepts related to 
infamy. In Duncan, the Court identified the question as whether “the length of 
the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is enough in 
itself to require a jury trial . . . .” Id. at 161. The Court there cited District of 
Columbia v. Clawans, which noted that at common law, petty offenses were 
“punished by commitment to jail, a workhouse, or a house of correction.” 
300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937). Thus, this line leaves open the possibility that the 
place of incarceration is relevant to the jury trial right. 
 113. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 67 (1986) (“[T]he petit jury’s 
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrates a fortiori that there 
was probable cause to charge the defendants with the offenses for which they 
were convicted. Therefore, the convictions must stand despite the rule viola-
tion.”); see United States v. Navarro, 608 F.3d 529, 539 (9th Cir. 2010) (discuss-
ing remedies for errors ruled upon before and after trial); United States v. Soto-
Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that “[a]ll but the most serious 
errors before the grand jury are rendered harmless by a conviction at trial”). 
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grand jury indictment even as to a palpably guilty defendant re-
quires a remedy, to protect innocent people who would be tried 
and acquitted if lack of an indictment were always cured by con-
viction.114 
The original view of courts and scholars was that “it is the 
infamous nature of the crime and not the character of the pun-
ishment” that makes an offense infamous.115 However, in the 
late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court defined “infamy” for 
purposes of the Grand Jury Clause to include all offenses author-
izing imposition of infamous penalties.116 That is, a grand jury 
indictment was required for an offense, which was not itself in-
famous (in that its elements did not imply disgrace), if that of-
fense could lead to infamous punishment. These decisions repre-
sented application of the indictment requirement to a new 
category of cases. 
The Court has made clear that the infamous nature of the 
punishment brings an offense into the scope of the Grand Jury 
Clause.117 However, the Court has not explicitly determined 
 
 114. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) (“While there was a 
variance in the sense of a variation between pleading and proof, that variation 
here destroyed the defendant’s substantial right to be tried only on charges pre-
sented in an indictment returned by a grand jury. Deprivation of such a basic 
right is far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a variance and then 
dismissed as harmless error.”); see Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 
489 U.S. 794, 802 (1989) (“Only a defect so fundamental that it causes the grand 
jury no longer to be a grand jury, or the indictment no longer to be an indict-
ment, gives rise to the constitutional right not to be tried.”). 
 115. Witnesses—Competency in General—Effect in Criminal Trial in Federal 
Courts of Former Conviction of Crime in State Courts, 30 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 
(1917) (citing People v. Park, 41 N.Y. 21, 29–30 (1869)); see Bartholomew v. Peo-
ple, 104 Ill. 601, 607 (1882); The King v. Priddle, 1 Leach C. C. 442, 442–43; 3 
SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 372, n.1 (15th ed. 1892)); see also People v. 
Toynbee, 1855 WL 6562 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1855) (“It was the infamy of the crime, 
and not the nature of the punishment, which constituted the crimen falsi.”); 
Infamy and Infamous Crimes, 16 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
OF LAW (Davis S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1900) (“But at pre-
sent it is the settled rule of the common law that it is the character of the crime, 
and not the nature of the punishment, which creates the infamy and destroys 
the competency of the witness. At present, therefore, a conviction of treason or 
felony, or of any species of the crimen falsi, will incapacitate the party convicted 
from giving evidence while it continues in force without regard to the punish-
ment inflicted.”); Infamous Crime—Definition, 15 YALE L.J. 305 (1906) (“[T]he 
decision as to the infamy of the offense depended, not on the punishment pre-
scribed, but in the character of the offense itself and that the statutory offense 
of which appellant was convicted did not involve the requisite degree of moral 
turpitude to make the transgression an infamous crime at common law.”). 
 116. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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whether the stigmatizing nature of an offense, in and of itself, 
makes it infamous—that is, the Court has not clarified whether 
the former rule, defining infamy based on stigmatizing crimes, 
was expanded (to include stigmatizing punishments and stigma-
tizing crimes) or replaced, meaning that only stigmatizing con-
sequences could make an offense infamous, regardless of the 
stigmatizing nature of the crime itself. 
For several reasons, the decisions should be read as expand-
ing the category of infamous crimes. First, the Clause’s drafting 
history shows that the Framers were initially concerned with 
imposition of infamous punishment, but ultimately decided to 
regulate charging infamous crimes, presumably because, in ad-
dition to punishment, they were concerned with stigma.118 Sec-
ond, conduct is a more direct signifier of disgrace than punish-
ment. As a matter of logic, if we assume average Americans do 
not regularly read sentencing statutes, they are more likely to 
have a negative reaction to a shameful crime than they are to 
know the particular punishment associated with a nonstigma-
tizing offense. If the indirect stigma resulting from potential 
punishment requires indictment, as the Supreme Court has 
held, then direct stigma based on the accusation itself also 
should. Accordingly, stigmatizing offenses should be charged by 
a grand jury even if no infamous punishment is authorized.119 
Perhaps this question was never resolved because it never 
needed to be resolved. There seem to be few, if any, offenses in-
volving stigmatizing conduct which do not carry stigmatizing 
penalties.120 
 
 118. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 119. Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 775 (Ind. 2011) (“This history not only 
demonstrates that disenfranchisement (along with the loss of other civil and 
political rights) was itself an infamous punishment, but it also suggests that, 
for purposes of the Infamous Crimes Clause, an infamous crime is one which by 
its own nature is infamous, irrespective of punishment.”); cf. WILLIAM EDEN 
AUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW § 3, at 51–52 (“Corporal punishments, 
immediately affecting the body, and publickly [sic] inflicted, ought to be infa-
mous in the estimation of the people; so should degradations from titles of honor, 
civil incapacities, brandings, and public exhibitions of the offender: all which 
penalties should be applied with great caution, and only to offences infamous in 
their nature.” (emphases added)). 
 120. 4 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.1(b), at 742 (4th 
ed. 2004) (“So too, any crime that could be viewed as infamous by virtue of its 
‘nature’ almost certainly will carry an infamous punishment.”). 
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B. CONGRESS, THE COURT, AND INFAMOUS MISDEMEANORS 
It is completely clear that misdemeanors can be infamous. 
For its part, Congress has recognized that misdemeanors can be 
infamous. For example, immigration law has long authorized de-
portation of noncitizens convicted of certain “felonies or other in-
famous crimes.”121 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that misdemeanors 
can be infamous. For example, Richardson v. Ramirez referred 
to “felonies or infamous crimes;”122 Justice Thomas, quoting 
Thomas Jefferson, referred to the effect of conviction “of felony, 
or other infamous crime”123 on eligibility for federal office. 
In two cases, the Court held that particular misdemeanors 
were infamous. In Bannon v. United States,124 a defendant 
claimed that an indictment was defective because it failed to ac-
cuse him of feloniously participating in a conspiracy. The Gov-
ernment conceded that the crime was infamous because it was 
punishable by confinement at hard labor, but the Court rejected 
the defense claim, holding that it does not “necessarily follow 
that because the punishment affixed to an offence is infamous, 
the offence itself is thereby raised to the grade of felony.”125 
 
 121. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–61 (2010) (“In 1891, Con-
gress added to the list of excludable persons those ‘who have been convicted of 
a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.’”) 
(quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084)); Ekiu v. United States, 142 
U.S. 651, 664 n.1 (1892) (quoting text of act). 
 122. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974) (noting that “29 
States had provisions in their constitutions which prohibited, or authorized the 
legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise by persons convicted of felonies 
or infamous crimes”). 
 123. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 874 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in 14 WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82–83 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904)); see Ansbro v. 
United States, 159 U.S. 695, 697 (1895) (“The offence for which Ansbro was 
indicted is not punishable by imprisonment for a term of over one year or at 
hard labor; and persons convicted thereof cannot be sentenced to imprisonment 
in a penitentiary. Rev. St. §§ 5541, 5542. Ansbro was not convicted, therefore, 
of an infamous crime.”); Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 233 (1875) (the question 
is “whether they impute a charge of felony or any other infamous crime punish-
able by law”). 
 124. 156 U.S. 464 (1895). 
 125. Id. at 467 (“If such imprisonment were made the sole test of felonies, it 
would necessarily follow that a great many offences of minor importance, such 
as selling distilled liquors without payment of the special tax, and other analo-
gous offences under the internal and customs revenue laws, would be treated as 
felonies, and the persons guilty of such offences stigmatized as felons.”). 
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Similarly, in United States v. Moreland,126 the Court held 
that a potential sentence to hard labor was infamous even for a 
crime Congress graded as a misdemeanor.127 The Ninth Circuit 
explained: “In Moreland, the Court necessarily rejected the fel-
ony-misdemeanor distinction when it held that hard labor, im-
posed as punishment for the misdemeanor of willfully [sic] ne-
glecting to support minor children, is infamous punishment and 
triggers the right to an indictment.”128 The D.C. Circuit agreed: 
“if the penalty imposed by statute for the punishment of a mis-
demeanor is infamous . . . the misdemeanor itself is regarded by 
the courts as an infamous crime, and not triable upon infor-
mation.”129 Many other lower federal courts have held or sug-
gested that a misdemeanor can be infamous if infamous penal-
ties are authorized.130 
Three decisions of various U.S. Courts of Appeal hold or sug-
gest that misdemeanors never need be indicted, sometimes rely-
ing on the concept of petty offense, which exempts certain minor 
offenses from the jury trial requirement.131 These decisions, 
 
 126. 258 U.S. 433 (1922). 
 127. Id. at 435. 
 128. United States v. Ramirez, 556 F.2d 909, 924 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 129. Cleveland v. Mattingly, 287 F. 948, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 130. The cases of which the authors are aware are: United States v. Fran-
cisco, 413 F. App’x 216, 218 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Where no ‘infamous’ punishment 
is prescribed, petty offenses and misdemeanors may be prosecuted by infor-
mation.”); Taylor v. United States, 142 F.2d 808, 816 (9th Cir. 1944) (“And it is 
well settled that a prosecution for misdemeanors, such as those under consider-
ation in this appeal, involving no infamous crime or no infamous punishment, 
may be by information.”); Falconi v. United States, 280 F. 766, 767 (6th Cir. 
1922) (“In the case of Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228 . . . the Supreme Court 
held that a statute authorizing imprisonment at hard labor for a definite period 
inflicts an infamous punishment, and therefore the offense, though a misde-
meanor, is an infamous crime, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”); 
United States v. Reef, 268 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (D. Colo. 1967) (“Although the 
offense with which defendant is charged is technically a misdemeanor,” indict-
ment is required); United States v. Sloan, 31 F. Supp. 327, 331 (W.D.S.C. 1940) 
(“No specific provision, making the particular misdemeanor infamous, is cou-
pled with the punishment of imprisonment prescribed by this statute.”); United 
States v. Yates, 6 F. 861, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1881) (“The omission to declare the 
crime a felony furnishes, no doubt, a reason for considering the crime to be a 
misdemeanor, but the fact that the offence is a misdemeanor is not conclusive 
of the question whether it be an infamous crime or not . . . .”). 
 131. United States v. Moncier, 492 F. App’x 507, 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Such 
a Class B misdemeanor is a ‘petty’ offense, 18 U.S.C. § 19, that does not entitle 
Moncier to a grand-jury indictment.”); United States v. Bator, 421 F. App’x 710, 
710 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the offenses charged were only petty offenses, a 
grand jury was not required . . . .”); Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 935 
(9th Cir. 2005) (stating, in dicta, that the grand jury requirement is inapplicable 
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however, are hardly dispositive. Two are nonprecedential un-
published decisions, and in the third, the statement is dicta. In 
addition, all three address the issue only in passing. For exam-
ple, they do not analyze any of the controlling Supreme Court 
cases holding that misdemeanors can be infamous, including 
Bannon v. United States132 and United States v. Moreland,133 nor 
do they address the contrary authority from their own circuits.134 
This is understandable because, at least in Moncier and Means, 
the two cases for which briefs are available online, the defend-
ants did not develop arguments that the misdemeanors with 
which they were charged were infamous. 
C. WHAT CATEGORIES OF MISDEMEANORS ARE INFAMOUS? 
Several qualities can make a misdemeanor, or any crime for 
that matter, infamous. As explained below, the crime may be 
subject to a punishment of imprisonment in a “state prison or 
penitentiary,” it may result in a loss of civil status, or it may be 
a crime of moral turpitude or a crimen falsi. 
1. Federal Imprisonment 
The Supreme Court held in 1888 that “imprisonment in a 
state prison or penitentiary, with or without hard labor, is an 
infamous punishment.”135 As a modern Second Circuit case ex-
plained, the Court “viewed prisons and penitentiaries as places 
of punishment . . . while viewing correctional facilities open only 
to minor offenders as centers for rehabilitation.”136 
The Court’s holdings that a person must be indicted by a 
 
to tribal courts, and “[t]he right to grand jury indictment would not pertain re-
gardless, because Means is charged with a misdemeanor.”). 
 132. 156 U.S. 464 (1895). 
 133. 258 U.S. 433 (1922). 
 134. See Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases cited supra in notes 128 & 130. 
 135. United States v. DeWalt, 128 U.S. 393, 394 (1888); see In re Mills, 135 
U.S. 263, 267 (1890) (“[T]his court decided, in respect to crimes against the 
United States that are punishable by ‘imprisonment,’ that being punishable by 
imprisonment in a state prison or penitentiary, they are infamous, within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, whether the accused is or 
is not put to hard labor, and, therefore, can be proceeded against only by pre-
sentment or indictment of a grand jury.”); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428 
(1885) (“For more than a century, imprisonment at hard labor in the State 
prison or penitentiary or other similar institution has been considered an infa-
mous punishment in England and America.”); cf. Brede v. Powers, 263 U.S. 4, 
13 (1923) (statute providing for “suitable employment of prisoners” not at hard 
labor and not for purposes of punishment is not infamous). 
 136. United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Wilson, 
114 U.S. at 428–29; Moreland, 258 U.S. at 440). 
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grand jury before being charged with a crime punishable by in-
carceration in a state prison seems odd, given that the Grand 
Jury Clause applies only to federal prosecutions, which, after 
conviction, would likely result in the defendant being sentenced 
to federal prison. However, when this line of cases developed, 
federal prisoners were often confined in state institutions.137 
Thus, for example, a person convicted in federal court in 1892 for 
violating the Chinese Exclusion Act and sentenced to sixty days 
at hard labor was confined in the Detroit House of Correction, 
not a federal facility.138 
No court, apparently, has questioned the continuing validity 
of the Supreme Court decisions holding that a crime is infamous 
and requires grand jury indictment if it carries a potential sen-
tence to a “state prison or penitentiary.”139 In addition, nothing 
suggests a constitutional difference between a sentence to a fed-
eral prison or penitentiary rather than to a state prison or peni-
tentiary.140 Even since the development of the modern system of 
federal prisons, the Court continues to refer to the “‘infamous 
punishment’ of imprisonment.”141 Therefore, now that the fed-
eral government confines most of its own convicts, “the distinc-
tion between prisons, where only serious offenders may be 
housed, and jails, where misdemeanants are housed, is, as it has 
been, the critical one.”142 
 
 137. Creekmore v. United States, 237 F. 743, 754 (8th Cir. 1916) (“It must 
be borne in mind that, while nearly all of the states have both penitentiaries 
and jails, the United States has no prisons except its penitentiaries, save as it 
has the use of state institutions.”). 
 138. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 229 (1896). 
 139. DeWalt, 128 U.S. at 394. 
 140. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137–38 (2003) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (using prison and penitentiary synonymously); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 581 n.9 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As ‘often’ used, a ‘prison’ is 
‘an institution for the imprisonment of persons convicted of major crimes or fel-
onies: a penitentiary as distinguished from a reformatory, local jail, or detention 
home.’” (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804 (1961))). 
 141. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (quoting Flemming v. 
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)). 
 142. United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 757, 761–62 (2d Cir. 1992); see, e.g., 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994) (contrasting “light penalties 
such as fines or short jail sentences” to “imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary.”); United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 440 (1922) (stating a sentence 
to a house of correction was not necessarily infamous: “Its purpose is refor-
mation, instruction in conduct, and diversion from a criminal career. To make 
it, therefore, a penitentiary would defeat the purpose of its creation.”); Cahill v. 
Biddle, 13 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1926) (“In popular estimation, imprisonment 
in a penitentiary has generally been considered as more ignominious punish-
ment than imprisonment in a jail . . . .”); Brown v. United States, 260 F. 752, 
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Because current sentencing statutes—including the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984—were drafted without apparent at-
tention to the scope of the Grand Jury Clause, all federal offenses 
carrying the possibility of incarceration are infamous, given they 
all authorize confinement in federal prison. Imagine Jane Smith 
is convicted of a federal infraction—the lowest level of offense, 
below a Class C misdemeanor—and receives the maximum term 
of imprisonment of “not more than five days.”143 Ms. Smith “shall 
be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons,”144 and 
“[t]he “Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional 
facility.”145 
An older law, 18 U.S.C. § 4083, provides that those “con-
victed of offenses against the United States or by courts-martial 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year may be con-
fined in any United States penitentiary,” but “[a] sentence for an 
offense punishable by imprisonment for one year or less shall not 
be served in a penitentiary without the consent of the defend-
ant.”146 Accordingly, Ms. Smith cannot be incarcerated in a pen-
itentiary without her consent. 
The Bureau of Prisons operates several types of facilities, 
including Federal Correctional Institutions, and more secure 
penitentiaries like Leavenworth.147 All are called prisons,148 in-
mates are called “federal prisoners,”149 and the Bureau of Pris-
ons operates the “federal prison system.”150 However, the courts, 
thus far, have interpreted § 4083 literally; it gives people con-
victed of low-level offenses the right not to be sent to peniten-
tiaries, but offers no protection against commitment to prisons 
or other institutions with names other than penitentiary.151 
 
753 (9th Cir. 1919) (distinguishing imprisonment in prison or penitentiary from 
jail sentence); Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1909) (under federal 
law, “any sentence for a period longer than one year may be executed in a peni-
tentiary, in place of a jail, workhouse, bridewell, or other place of confinement 
deemed less degrading”). 
 143. 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(9) (2012). 
 144. Id. § 3621(a). 
 145. Id. § 3621(b). 
 146. Id. § 4083. 
 147. 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(d) (2000) (listing types of federal prisons). 
 148. Our Locations, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/ 
locations/list.jsp (last visited March 6, 2018) (see “Locations” and “Prisons” un-
der facility types tab). 
 149. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001). 
 150. Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 486 (1981). 
 151. See United States v. Washington, 101 F. App’x 873, 876 (3d Cir. 2004) 
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Using the literal approach heretofore applied by federal 
courts, the Attorney General could permissibly assign Ms. 
Smith, sentenced to five days for a federal infraction, to a prison. 
Also, instead of calling Leavenworth a penitentiary, it could be 
renamed a prison. Then it might become permissible to confine 
Ms. Smith there without her consent, because it would no longer 
be a penitentiary. It cannot be that the Framers of the Fifth 
Amendment intended the Grand Jury Clause to be so easily 
evaded. 
A more realistic, functional approach would inquire whether 
federal prisons and penitentiaries are constitutionally distinct 
from state prisons and penitentiaries in the stigma they impose. 
It is highly doubtful that alumni of federal prisons are, somehow, 
more esteemed than former state prisoners.152 Therefore, a po-
tential sentence to federal prison is just as stigmatizing as a po-
tential sentence to state prison. If so, all federal offenses with 
the possibility of incarceration are infamous, and no one may be 
convicted of even the most trivial federal crime in the absence of 
a grand jury indictment. 
This problem could be solved by Congress amending § 4083 
so that those convicted only of misdemeanors may not be con-
fined to either a prison or a penitentiary without their consent. 
 
(“A crime is not infamous if it is not punishable by imprisonment in a peniten-
tiary . . . and, under 18 U.S.C. § 4083, no one may be imprisoned in a peniten-
tiary unless their offense is punishable by more than a year in prison.”); United 
States v. Colt, 126 F.3d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1997) (“To be entitled to a grand jury, 
therefore, Colt needed to be subject to imprisonment in a penitentiary. Colt, 
however, was never at risk of going to the penitentiary. As noted above, 
18 U.S.C. § 4083 authorizes penitentiary imprisonment only for offenses pun-
ishable by imprisonment exceeding one year.”); United States v. Emily, No. 91-
1337, 1991 WL 240131 at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 1991) (per curiam) (“This facil-
ity is a Federal Correctional Institution, not a penitentiary . . . . Sentencing 
[misdemeanant serving a six month sentence] to this institution does not violate 
the statute.”); United States v. Hanyard, 762 F.2d 1226, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“[A]ppellant admits that he is presently confined in the minimum security fed-
eral prison camp at Big Spring, Texas. Therefore, appellant is not confined in a 
United States penitentiary within the meaning of section 4083, but in a distinct 
type of institution, a federal prison camp.”); United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 
569, 572 (8th Cir. 1979) (“If punished as a principal under § 7205, Freeman 
could not be imprisoned for more than one year. Because he could not therefore 
be required to serve his sentence in a penitentiary without his consent his crime 
cannot be deemed infamous and an indictment was not required.”); United 
States v. Campbell, No. 3:06-CR-038, 2006 WL 2548732, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 
31, 2006) (“Defendant is incarcerated in a federal correctional institution, not a 
federal penitentiary and 18 U.S.C. § 4083 therefore does not apply to his case.”). 
 152. Cf. United States v. Rutledge, 33 F.3d 671, 672 (6th Cir. 1994) (explain-
ing properly, in response to the defense’s argument, why the government made 
“a federal case out of” the incident). 
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Alternatively, the courts holding that the statute is inapplicable 
to prisons could overrule those decisions. Until then, though, all 
federal offenses providing for the possibility of incarceration are 
infamous and can only be charged by indictment. 
2. Loss of Civil Status 
An offense resulting in loss of civil rights is infamous. 
Thomas Cooley wrote: “[a]n infamous offence is one involving 
moral turpitude in the offender, or infamy in the punishment, or 
both . . . [and includes] any punishment that involves the loss of 
civil or political privileges.”153 Similarly, in a criminal law trea-
tise cited by the Supreme Court,154 one scholar explained: 
[c]orporal punishments, immediately affecting the body, and publickly 
[sic] inflicted, ought to be infamous in the estimation of the people; so 
should degradations from titles of honor, civil incapacities, brandings, 
and public exhibitions of the offender: all which penalties should be 
applied with great caution, and only to offenses infamous in their na-
ture.155 
Using a double negative, the Supreme Court determined 
that ineligibility to hold office rendered a crime infamous. In Ex 
parte Wilson, the Court stated: “We are not indeed disposed to 
deny that a crime, to the conviction and punishment of which 
Congress has superadded a disqualification to hold office, is 
thereby made infamous.”156 The North Carolina Supreme Court 
similarly observed: 
[T]he disqualification to hold office is certainly a punishment that im-
plies disgrace and infamy. It fixes upon the convicted party a stigma of 
disgrace and reproach in the eyes of honest and honorable men that 
continues for life. It is difficult to conceive of a punishment more galling 
and degrading in this country than disqualification to hold office, 
whether one be an office seeker or not. Here, generally, all honest men 
are eligible to office, to share in the honors and emoluments incident to 
it. How great the standing disgrace that one cannot, because of crime 
 
 153. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 291 (1880); see also JAMES PARKER 
HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106 (1915) (“Imprisonment in a state prison or 
penitentiary is an infamous punishment, also deprivation of ordinary civil or 
political privileges.”). 
 154. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 (1885). 
 155. WILLIAM EDEN AUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 51–52 (1771). 
 156. Wilson, 114 U.S. at 426 (citing United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 
82 (1884)) (noting but not deciding the question); see also, e.g., Chandler v. Ju-
dicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 135 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“Some functions performed by a Judicial Council may be ‘administrative.’ But 
where, as here, it moves to disqualify a judge from sitting, removing him pro 
tanto from office, it moves against the individual with all of the sting and much 
of the stigma that impeachment carries.”). 
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that imputes corruption in office!157 
The constitutional text itself suggests that misdemeanors 
resulting in loss of office require grand jury indictment. The Con-
stitution provides that “[t]he President, Vice President and all 
Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office 
on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”158 While punishment 
“shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and dis-
qualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or 
Profit under the United States,” the Constitution provides that 
“the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to 
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to 
Law.”159 Accordingly, the Constitution suggests that any misde-
meanor serious enough to warrant removal from office can only 
be prosecuted by grand jury indictment. 
As office-holders themselves, judges might be particularly 
sensitive to denial of the right to hold office, but the loss of other 
rights is also serious. The Court has recognized that conviction 
of an infamous crime is associated with the loss of voting 
rights;160 the ability to serve on a jury;161 or to hold a fiduciary 
appointment.162 A District of Columbia judge explained: “To 
make that penalty infamous, it must pronounce against the of-
fender a degradation from his civil rights as a citizen, the right 
of franchise, the right of giving testimony, or some other civil or 
 
 157. Harris v. Terry, 3 S.E. 745, 746 (N.C. 1887). Of course, the court here 
interpreted its own law, not the U.S. Constitution, but its discussion is relevant 
to the question of stigma. 
 158. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4. 
 159. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
 160. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 983 (1991) (“The disenfranchise-
ment of a citizen,’ [the judge] said, ‘is not an unusual punishment; it was the 
consequence of treason, and of infamous crimes, and it was altogether discre-
tionary in the legislature to extend that punishment to other offences.” (quoting 
Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457, 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823), aff ’d, 3 Cow. 686 (N.Y. 
1824))). 
 161. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67 (1883) (“It is perfectly clear that 
all persons serving upon the grand jury must be good and lawful men; by which 
it is intended, that they [among other things must not be] attainted of any trea-
son or felony; or convicted of any species of crimen falsi, as conspiracy or perjury, 
which may render them infamous.”); cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) 
(“Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege 
of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic 
process.”). 
 162. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U.S. 238, 243 (1875) (“Thus 
persons convicted of infamous crime are excluded from this office, and persons 
of notoriously evil lives may be passed by in the discretion of the Probate 
Court.”). 
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political right existing in the privileges of citizenship.”163 Other 
federal164 and state165 cases recognize that the loss of civil rights 
or privileges are consequences of a criminal charge that make it 
infamous. 
Having rights equal to others in the community is an im-
portant aspect of dignified membership. A clear form of stigma 
is a legal sanction imposed by the government on the ground that 
one is dangerous, degraded, impaired or unqualified.166 The Su-
preme Court has long recognized that deprivation of rights based 
 
 163. United States v. Cross, No. 8709, 1873 WL 15854, at *4 (D.C. Sept. 
1873). 
 164. United States v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 637 F.2d 1248, 1253–54 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (“The possibility of imprisonment in a penitentiary is only one index 
of whether a crime is infamous. . . . In addition, crimes punishable at common 
law by civil disabilities were deemed infamous. The indictment clauses of sev-
eral state constitutions are interpreted to require indictment for such crimes, 
and at least one federal court has suggested that such crimes are infamous 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”); United States v. Field, 16 F. 
778, 782 (C.C.D. Vt. 1883) (“‘But the punishment of the penitentiary must al-
ways be deemed infamous; and so must any punishment that involves the loss 
of civil or political privileges.’ Cooley, Const. Law, 29.”); United States v. Butler, 
25 F. Cas. 226, 226 (C.C.D.S.C. 1876) (“But in looking through that chapter 
there is no crime mentioned which can be thought infamous unless it be the one 
described in section 5508, under which this information is filed; for which the 
party convicted is not only to be fined and imprisoned but also to be disqualified 
ever thereafter from holding any place of trust and profit or honor under the 
laws of the United States, and is rendered ineligible to office.”). 
 165. People ex rel. Akin v. Kipley, 49 N.E. 229, 239 (Ill. 1897) (citing Ex parte 
Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885)) (“A crime which subjects the party to a disqualifi-
cation to hold office in case he is convicted of such crime is an infamous crime. 
Disqualification from holding office, if inflicted as a punishment for crime, is an 
infamous punishment.”); Burke v. Stewart, 1898 WL 3061, at *2 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Dec. 1898) (“that the conviction of ‘any crime’ meant by the statute was the con-
viction of such a crime as at common law worked a disability to testify, that is 
to say, conviction of an infamous offense”); State v. Clark, 56 P. 767, 770 (Kan. 
1899) (“it was not intended that anything short of infamous punishment should 
take away the civil rights of the convict, or incapacitate him as a witness”); King 
v. City of Pineville, 299 S.W. 1082, 1084 (Ky. 1927) (“infliction of a punishment 
of deprivation of suffrage degrades the offender”); State v. Bussay, 96 A. 337, 
339 (R.I. 1916) (“Is the offense charged in this complaint an infamous crime? 
We think not. A crime to be thus characterized must come within the crimen 
falsi, such as forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury; that is, offenses affecting 
the public administration of justice, or such as would affect civil or political 
rights, disqualifying or rendering a person incompetent to be a witness or a ju-
ror.”); Cole v. Campbell, 968 S.W.2d 274, 275–76 (Tenn. 1998) (“Virtually every 
jurisdiction subjects a convicted defendant not only to criminal punishment but 
also sanctions that restrict civil and proprietary rights. . . . Such restrictions, or 
civil disabilities, date back to ancient Greece and Rome, when a criminal con-
viction rendered one infamous, and resulted in the loss of the right to vote, hold 
office, make speeches or assemble.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 166. A related principle allows a suit against the government for defamation 
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on status imposes the most serious sort of stigma.167 Thus, in 
Strauder v. West Virginia,168 the Court held that it was uncon-
stitutional to exclude African Americans from jury service in 
part because of the stigma of legal inequality: 
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied 
by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as 
jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in 
other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed 
by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race 
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race 
that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.169 
The Court has also recognized that denial of the right to 
 
resulting in some tangible harm: 
This circuit, in turn, has consistently interpreted [the] “stigma plus” 
test [of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)] to require two forms of gov-
ernment action before a plaintiff can “transform a [common law] defa-
mation into a [constitutional] deprivation of liberty.” Mosrie v. Barry, 
718 F.2d 1151, 1161–62 (D.C. Cir. 1983). First, the government must 
be the source of the defamatory allegations. See id. at 1161. Second, the 
resulting “stigma” must involve some tangible change of status vis-a-
vis the government. As the Mosrie court explained: [T]he principal re-
cent cases from this court in which a government-imposed stigma was 
found to have deprived the stigmatized person of a liberty interest in-
volved either loss of employment or foreclosure of a right to be consid-
ered for government contracts in common with all other persons. Id. at 
1161 (emphasis added). 
Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1108–09 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 167. Stevenson’s Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. 207, 263 n.a (1820) (noting that 
under Roman law, “[n]one of these different classes of illegitimate offspring 
were stigmatized by civil degradation, or excluded from aspiring to public hon-
ours”). 
 168. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), abrogated on other 
grounds, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
 169. Id. at 308. More recently, the Court explained: 
[I]n upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a, which forbids race discrimination in public accommo-
dations, we emphasized that its “fundamental object . . . was to vindi-
cate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies deni-
als of equal access to public establishments.’” Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing in-
jury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is 
surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis 
of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race. 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984); see also, e.g., Tennessee v. 
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 536 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The Americans with 
Disabilities Act . . . is a measure expected to advance equal-citizenship stature 
for persons with disabilities.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, 
and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 471 (2000) (ADA aims both to “guarante[e] 
a baseline of equal citizenship by protecting against stigma and systematic ex-
clusion from public and private opportunities, and [to] protec[t] society against 
the loss of valuable talents”). 
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marry, as well as the termination of parental rights, is stigma-
tizing.170 It is clear that the special harm is the injury coupled 
with an insult. For example, the Court found that the Constitu-
tion imposed special procedural restrictions in connection with 
claims of parental incompetence: “Victory by the State not only 
makes termination of parental rights possible; it entails a judi-
cial determination that the parents are unfit to raise their own 
children.”171 Further, many courts have recognized that the loss 
of otherwise available firearms rights is potentially stigmatizing 
in addition to its restriction on conduct.172 
Any consequence of conviction of a misdemeanor resulting 
in loss of equal civil status should require indictment. This in-
cludes loss of the right to hold office; to vote; to possess firearms; 
or to serve on a jury. 
While there are arguably others, three specific classes of 
misdemeanors are infamous because of their association with 
the loss of key civil rights. First, by federal statute, all drug of-
fenses carry with them the possibility of being sentenced to inel-
igibility for federal benefits.173 This is a stigmatizing loss of 
 
 170. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“[L]aws exclud-
ing same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the 
kind prohibited by our basic charter .”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675, 2693 (2013) (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in 
question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon 
all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned author-
ity of the States.”). 
 171. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982). 
 172. In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594, 597 (Alaska 2012) (“Joan notes that several 
other courts have applied the collateral consequences exception to mootness in 
the involuntary commitment context. She points to social stigma, adverse em-
ployment restrictions, application in future legal proceedings, and restrictions 
on the right to possess firearms as recognized consequences from involuntary 
commitment orders.”); Ritchie v. Konrad, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 393 (Ct. App. 
2004) (“a protective order imposes costs and penalties on the restrained party—
the stigma (which may have practical consequences for employment and else-
where in life) and, for those with reasons to own or use firearms in their profes-
sion or for protection or just for sport, there is the automatic firearm relinquish-
ment requirement . . . .”); Monzingo v. Garden Grove, 190 Cal. Rptr. 750, 753 
(Ct. App. 1983) (“On the other hand, the denial of the statutory privilege of a 
retired officer to carry a concealed firearm for his own protection, particularly 
when it is based on certain medical reports, carries a stigma of mental instabil-
ity which could cause serious damage to one’s reputation and acceptance in the 
community.”); People v. Holt, 998 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (“Beyond 
the stigma attached to the finding and treatment order, defendant could suffer 
adverse legal consequences including, for instance, limitations on her right to 
own firearms . . . .”), aff ’d, 21 N.E.3d 695 (Ill. 2014). 
 173. Section 862(b) provides: 
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equal status. 
Second, sex offenses requiring registration are infamous. It 
is hard to imagine a more stigmatizing offense than one requir-
ing registration and public disclosure. Misdemeanor offenses can 
sometimes require registration.174 Professor Catherine Carpen-
ter explained: 
[T]hese laws also serve to name, brand, and stigmatize those convicted 
of sexual offenses, a stigma that attaches and follows the offender for 
years, no matter the inconsequential nature of the underlying offense. 
Steeped in historical tradition, public humiliation serves as an im-
portant tool for a community to expend its disapprobation for a 
crime.175 
Third, deportation based on criminal conviction is insulting 
as well as injurious, making it akin to the other infamous pun-
ishments. The Supreme Court has recognized “the stigma of de-
portation,”176 as have other courts.177 One scholar wrote that 
“[w]hile deportation is not technically considered punishment, it 
is clearly understood as a shame-inducing punishment by depor-
tees, their families, and the communities from which they origi-
nate.”178 Any offense serious enough to warrant deportation 
 
(1) Any individual who is convicted of any Federal or State offense in-
volving the possession of a controlled substance (as such term is defined 
for purposes of this subchapter) shall— 
  (A) upon the first conviction for such an offense and at the discre-
tion of the court— 
  (i) be ineligible for any or all Federal benefits for up to one year; 
  (ii) be required to successfully complete an approved drug treat-
ment program which includes periodic testing to insure that the indi-
vidual remains drug free; 
  (iii) be required to perform appropriate community service; or 
  (iv) any combination of clause (i), (ii), or (iii) . . . . 
21 U.S.C. § 862(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iv) (2012). 
 174. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 175. Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex 
Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 299 (2006) (internal citations 
omitted); see also, e.g., State v. Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267, 1273 (Utah 2014) (“[W]e 
begin by acknowledging the serious social stigmas that attach to one who must 
register as a sex offender.”). 
 176. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 26 (1982). 
 177. See also, e.g., Yam Sang Kwai v. INS, 411 F.2d 683, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
(Skelly Wright, J., dissenting) (“[D]eportation [is] a sanction often indistin-
guishable from criminal punishment in the shame and distress it brings upon 
those subjected to it.”); Ex parte Bun Chew, 220 F. 387, 389 (S.D. Cal. 1915) 
(“This petitioner herein should be awarded his liberty, and absolved, not only 
from the stigma placed upon him, but also from the unjust interference with his 
freedom of action.”). 
 178. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Property, Visa as Collateral, 
64 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1070 n.63 (2011) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Eunice 
Hyunhye Cho, Giselle A. Hass & Leticia M. Saucedo, A New Understanding of 
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should be charged by indictment. 
3. Misdemeanors of Crimen Falsi and Moral Turpitude 
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a person may be 
impeached based on conviction of certain misdemeanors.179 The 
inability to testify or to testify without impeachment based on 
conviction of a crime180 represents both the loss of a civil right181 
and a stigmatizing mark of shame.182 Conviction of a crime of 
moral turpitude or a crime classified as crimen falsi183 reduces a 
 
Substantial Abuse: Evaluating Harm in U Visa Petitions for Immigrant Victims 
of Workplace Crime, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 23 (2014) (“In many cases, fear of 
deportation is a significant obstacle to coping with workplace abuse, as depor-
tation would generate significant shame and hardship to a worker and his or 
her family, invoking a stigma of failure, and making it more difficult to seek 
employment and rebuild a life back in the worker ’s home country.” 
 179. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (“For any crime regardless of the punishment, 
the evidence must be admitted if the court can readily determine that establish-
ing the elements of the crime required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a 
dishonest act or false statement.”). 
 180. There has long been debate about whether impairment of testimonial 
rights is punishment. Compare Evidence—Witnesses: Incompetency by Infamy—
Power of Legislature to Declare Previously Convicted Persons Competent, 
42 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1929) (“The disqualification of witnesses for infamy 
is not properly a punishment, but merely a refusal to hear those supposed to 
have no regard for truth.”), with John MacArthur Maguire & Charles S. S. Ep-
stein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies As to Admissibility, 
36 YALE L.J. 1101, 1101 n.5 (1927) (“Disqualification visited upon a would-be 
witness because of infamy involved a punitive element, added to the notion that 
as an infamous person he was unworthy of belief.”). 
 181. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to 
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property 
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”). 
 182. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511–12 (1989) (“As the 
law evolved, this absolute bar gradually was replaced by a rule that allowed 
such witnesses to testify in both civil and criminal cases, but also to be im-
peached by evidence of a prior felony conviction or a crimen falsi misdemeanor 
conviction.”). As one court explained: 
The fact that a statute may classify his acts as grand and petit larceny, 
and not punish the latter with imprisonment and declare it to be only 
a misdemeanor, does not destroy the fact that theft, whether it be 
grand or petit larceny involves moral turpitude. It is malum in se, and 
so the consensus of opinion—statute or no statute—deduces from the 
commission of crimes malum in se the conclusion that the perpetrator 
is depraved in mind and is without moral character, because, forsooth, 
his very act involves moral turpitude. 
Bartos v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Neb., 19 F.2d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1927). 
 183. Crimen falsi are offenses “pertaining to dishonesty,” Green, 490 U.S. at 
507, including “forgery, perjury, the alteration of the current coin, dealing with 
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person’s rights as a witness because it constitutes evidence of 
bad character.184 And a crime need not be a felony to be used for 
impeachment.185 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recog-
 
false weights and measures, etc.” Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 466 (1888). 
 184. E.g., Dixon v. McMullen, 527 F. Supp. 711, 718 (N.D. Tex.1981) (holding 
that a pardon “may remove some disabilities, but does not change the common-
law principle that a conviction of an infamous offense is evidence of bad charac-
ter”). 
 185. See, e.g., United States v. Saitta, 443 F.2d 830, 831 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The 
law is clear in this circuit that any witness, including a defendant who elects to 
testify, can be discredited by a showing of prior felony convictions or misde-
meanor convictions involving moral turpitude.”); Christianson v. United States, 
226 F.2d 646, 655 (8th Cir. 1955) (“Evidence of the conviction of crime as affect-
ing the credibility of a witness is limited to conviction of a felony, an infamous 
crime, or a crime involving moral turpitude.”); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 
80, 86 (4th Cir. 1941) (“In criminal cases a witness may be asked, for purposes 
of impeachment, whether he has been convicted of a felony, infamous crime, 
petit larceny, or a crime involving moral turpitude.”); Coulston v. United States, 
51 F.2d 178, 182 (10th Cir. 1931) (“In criminal cases a witness may be asked, 
for purposes of impeachment, whether he has been convicted of a felony, infa-
mous crime, petit larceny, or a crime involving moral turpitude . . . .”). 
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nized that infringement of testimonial capacity is a characteris-
tic of infamous crimes,186 as have other federal187 and state 
courts188 and scholars.189 
 
 186. United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 595 (1878) (“Accomplices in guilt, 
not previously convicted of an infamous crime, when separately tried are com-
petent witnesses for or against each other . . . .”). 
 187. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 1976) (“The 
term crimen falsi has roots in the common law doctrine that persons convicted 
of certain kinds of crimes were disqualified from testifying.”); Campbell v. 
United States, 176 F.2d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (“At common law, a witness could 
be asked, for impeachment purposes, whether he had ever been convicted of a 
crime only if the conviction had been for an infamous crime involving moral 
turpitude.”); Solomon v. United States, 297 F. 82, 92–93 (1st Cir. 1924) (“In 
Greenleaf ’s Evidence, vol. 1, §§ 372 and 373, the author, in speaking of the com-
mon-law rule of the disqualification of a witness, says that its basis seems to be 
that ‘infamous persons—i.e., persons convicted of heinous offenses—[are] mor-
ally too corrupt to be trusted to testify; so reckless of the distinction between 
truth and falsehood and insensible to the restraining force of an oath as to ren-
der it extremely improbable that . . . [they] will speak the truth at all;’ that ‘the 
usual and more general enumeration [of crimes that will render the perpetrator 
thus infamous] is, treason, felony and the crimen falsi.” (alterations in origi-
nal)); Pollard v. United States, 261 F. 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1919) (“The offense was 
not one involving moral turpitude, nor was it a crimen falsi, and it was not pun-
ishable by a penitentiary or hard labor sentence, and so was not an infamous 
crime, which was triable, under the Constitution, only by indictment.”); United 
States v. Smith, 40 F. 755, 758 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1889) (“This is not strictly so, for 
all these courts had held that in addition to the crimen falsi those crimes of 
every grade which the statutes declared to be felonies were infamous, and 
should be prosecuted on indictments.”); United States v. Maxwell, 26 F. Cas. 
1221, 1222 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1875) (“The words ‘infamous crime,’ have a fixed and 
settled meaning. In a legal sense they are descriptive of an offense that subjects 
a person to infamous punishment or prevents his being a witness.”); id. at 1223 
(“minor offenses . . . involving no moral turpitude” may be prosecuted by infor-
mation). 
 188. See, e.g., State v. Hatch, 239 P.3d 432, 434 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (“Like 
its federal counterpart, [Ariz. R. Evid.] Rule 609(a) traces its origins to the com-
mon law’s total prohibition on the testimony of those previously convicted of 
‘crimes of infamy’: treason, felonies, and crimen falsi.”); State v. Oldner, 206 
S.W.3d 818, 824 (Ark. 2005) (“Thus, for the purposes of a rule permitting im-
peachment of a witness on the basis of his or her conviction of an ‘infamous 
crime,’ the term has been deemed to include treason, crimes that were common-
law felonies, and other ‘crimen falsi’ . . . .” (citation omitted)); Kurtz v. Farring-
ton, 132 A. 540, 542 (Conn. 1926) (“Treason, felony, and the crimen falsi, as at 
common law, including all crimes for which the punishment prescribed must be 
imprisonment in the state prison, are infamous crimes, and this term includes, 
in addition, all crimes or misdemeanors which in their nature involve moral 
turpitude, and must be punished by imprisonment in jail for a term which may 
be six months or more.”); Dorcy v. City of Dover Bd. of Elections, No. CIV. A. 
93C-12-31, 1994 WL 146012, at *5 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 1994) (“A traditional 
and long-standing definition of infamous crime is that it includes crimen falsi 
. . . .”), aff ’d, 642 A.2d 836 (Del. 1994); People v. Spates, 395 N.E.2d 563, 567 
(Ill. 1979) (“Crimen falsi is a class of offenses, misdemeanors at common law, 
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Additionally, there is no apparent jurisprudential move-
ment against the idea that it is stigmatizing to brand a person a 
liar and of bad character. Under modern federal evidence law, 
those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude are no longer incom-
petent to testify as witnesses, but their rights are systematically 
impaired. Their ability to assert and enforce their rights is sub-
ject to the reality that their testimony as witnesses is automati-
cally discredited.190 
 
which, along with treason and any felony, comprise the infamous crimes.” (cita-
tion omitted)); Tucker v. Lower, 434 P.2d 320, 324 (Kan. 1967) (“Infamous 
crimes are treason, felony and the crimen falsi.”); Wicks v. State, 535 A.2d 459, 
461 (Md. 1988) (“Infamous crimes at common law also included the crimen 
falsi.”); State v. Bussay, 96 A. 337, 339 (R.I. 1916) (“Is the offense charged in 
this complaint an infamous crime? We think not. A crime to be thus character-
ized must come within the crimen falsi, such as forgery, perjury, subornation of 
perjury; that is, offenses affecting the public administration of justice, or such 
as would affect civil or political rights, disqualifying or rendering a person in-
competent to be a witness or a juror.”); State v. Jeffcoat, 146 S.E. 95, 96 (S.C. 
1928) (“The rule of the common law was that a person was incompetent as a 
witness if he had been convicted of an infamous crime, such as treason, felony, 
or any of the crimen falsi, but a mere conviction of crime did not disqualify if 
the offender had not been thereby rendered infamous.” (citation omitted)); Bell 
v. Commonwealth, 189 S.E. 441, 443 (Va. 1937) (“At common law, persons con-
victed in courts of record of crimes which render them infamous are excluded 
from being witnesses. ‘Infamous’ crime in this sense is regarded as comprehend-
ing, treason, felony, and crimen falsi.” (citation omitted)); State v. Bezemer, 14 
P.2d 460, 464 (Wash. 1932) (“Infamous crimes included treason, felony, any of-
fense that tended to pervert the administration of justice, and those that fell 
within the term ‘crimen falsi’ at the Roman law.” (citation omitted)). 
 189. 2 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL 
EVIDENCE § 7:6 (15th ed. 1998) (“At common law, a person convicted in a court 
of record of a crime that rendered him ‘infamous’ was incompetent to be a wit-
ness. Infamous crime, in the sense intended, included treason, felony, and 
crimen falsi.”); 22 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM: CRIMINAL LAW § 6 (2006) (“An ‘in-
famous’ crime, in this sense, is regarded as comprehending treason, felony, and 
crimen falsi.”); 21 THOMSON REUTERS, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 129 (2d ed. 
2016) (“[F]or the purposes of a rule permitting impeachment of a witness on the 
basis of [his or her] conviction of an ‘infamous crime,’ the term has been deemed 
to include treason, crimes that were common-law felonies, and other ‘crimen 
falsi’ . . . .”); 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 22 (15th ed. 
1993) (“At common law, a person convicted of a crime which rendered him infa-
mous was thereby made incompetent as a witness. An ‘infamous’ crime included 
treason, felony, and crimen falsi.”); 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON 
THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 651 (1904) (“The usual 
and more general enumeration is, treason, felony, and the crimen falsi.”); Brian 
C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 153 
n.396 (2003) (“‘Infamous crimes’ probably comprise common-law felonies, trea-
son, and crimen falsi such as perjury, embezzlement, theft, and fraud.”); Note, 
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118 (1929) (“The 
classifications in vogue included felony and misdemeanor, crimes mala in se and 
mala prohibita, crimen falsi, and infamous crimes.”). 
 190. See Gabriel J. Chin, “A Chinaman’s Chance” in Court: Asian Pacific 
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[A]s an attorney explained in one Kentucky case, acts involving moral 
turpitude were set apart by the permanent harm they could inflict upon 
reputation. “We estimate the character of a man by the uniform tenor 
of his life,” the attorney reasoned, and “there are particular acts of 
moral turpitude, the commission of which, would be decisive of his in-
famy, and stamp an indelible stigma on his reputation . . . .”191 
  CONCLUSION   
Many more federal misdemeanors should be charged by in-
dictment. Notably, many misdemeanors are infamous because 
they authorize imprisonment or carry stigmatizing conse-
quences. Congress has the ability to change their status by elim-
inating the statutory collateral consequences associated with 
them—rendering them noninfamous. Given that Congress has 
elected to attach serious consequences to misdemeanor convic-
tions,192 it is hardly unfair or unreasonable that the procedures 
associated with serious crimes, including a grand jury indict-
ment, should equally apply to misdemeanor offenses. 
Admittedly, increased use of the grand jury is a limited re-
sponse to the problems of the U.S. criminal-justice system. More 
direct remedies might include criminalizing less conduct and 
providing more opportunities for precharge diversion,193 allow-
ing defendants to avoid charges altogether. These and other re-
forms are well worth considering. But requiring grand jury in-
dictments for more misdemeanors has the advantage of being 
based on the text of the Constitution and existing Supreme 
Court precedent. Accordingly, although resorting to the grand 
jury is a second- or third-best solution, it has the virtue of being 
a remedy at hand. 
It is true that the grand jury usually indicts. But it is also 
true that the federal nonconviction rate for misdemeanors is ap-
proximately five times higher than it is for felonies. Misdemean-
ors can be profoundly stigmatizing, yet are much more likely to 
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 191. Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1015 
(2012) (quoting Johnson v. Moore’s Heirs, 11 Ky. 371, 380 (1822)); see also id. at 
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turpitude in men.”). 
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 193. See Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
165, 195 (2013). 
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be charged without careful consideration. If the federal authori-
ties used grand juries to carefully investigate and evaluate mi-
nor charges, and charged only those misdemeanors that they be-
lieved should and could result in a conviction, thousands of 
offenses would likely drop off the criminal records of Ameri-
cans.194 This is the right outcome because the Constitution con-
templated that these prosecutions never should have been insti-
tuted.195 
 
 194. See supra Part II.A. 
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